67 The treaties are in force: a list of treaties and other international agreements concluded by the United States (1929-2017) [tif]. The dataset is limited to agreements concluded since 1982, as its construction requires cross-references with the Kavass`Guide of Treaty in Force, first published in 1982. For the first time since 1957, the U.S. State Department has not published a separate edition of the TIF for 2013 and 2014, making it difficult to give the exact year of the expiry of the agreements during this two-year period. The analysis is therefore completed in 2012. 98 It cannot be ruled out that the importance of agreements within a category of experts varies more than the importance of agreements between categories of specialists. This possibility is discussed below at 87-88. 62 For a discussion on the importance and difficulty of measuring compliance with international agreements see Downs, George W., Rocke, David M. Barsoom, Peter N., Is the Good News Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 Int`l Org. 379 (1996). A second limitation of this study is that, while the contracts indicate that they are considered a political instrument, they do not speak directly of the relative importance of the various assumptions for greater contract sustainability.
Several mechanisms have been proposed to explain this sustainability, ranging from signal theory to the stability of senators` preferences, to the possibility that the consultation and approval process will reveal more credible information to negotiating partners. Of course, none of these statements exclude each other; Indeed, it may be naïve to think that a single theory can explain the choice between the engagement mechanisms for each agreement. However, since all the mechanisms in this analysis yield identical results, the results are not indicative for those who are interested in evaluating and comparing the relative importance of each of the proposed explanations. Proponents of signal theory model the negotiation process for international agreements as a three-round signal game: first, randomly determine whether the president is reliable or not. Then the president chooses the contract or executive agreement. Finally, it is the negotiating partner who decides whether to accept or reject the proposed agreement, and the parties pay their fees and receive their benefits. In reality, international cooperation is more complex. In particular, signal theory only implies the commitment of the president willing to negotiate, although many agreements are intended to survive and survive presidential terms. The signal model does not show why negotiators should place great confidence in the promises made by a government in the form of treaties when future administrations can easily denounce the agreement. The data also suggest that theories that explain the use of contracts by historical conventions leave many themes unexplained.
Although some scientists, for example, have argued that dependence on pathways explains why treaties are particularly common in human rights and are lacking in trade, Table 2 shows that neither subject is a particularly striking outlier. While in the field of human rights treaties are somewhat widespread (17 per cent of all agreements), the choice of this instrument remains the exception and not the norm. Similarly, the application of contracts in sectors such as trade, trade and finance is close to the 5% average, raising the question of whether the scarcity of the instrument in these areas can best be explained by historical events or whether it reflects another aversion to the treaty, which also concerns other areas. In summary, it is difficult to explain the diversity of contract prevalence in the different disciplines of conventional theories.