Some articles, such as Arora and Cason (1995), examine the choice of companies to participate in voluntary government-subsidized over-compliance programs, such as the 33/50 program sponsored by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. They find that companies with high toxic emissions are more likely to participate in this program. They see this result as a sign of hope, as these companies have the greatest potential to reduce emissions. This expression differs from equation (52) only in that subsidies replace the emissions tax and replace E – E0 E in the far-right term, which is the revenue-recycling effect. Therefore, the subsidy generates the same primary interest and tax effects as the emissions tax. This is in line with the view that, for an undertaking with a base emission of 0, a subsidy for the issuance of a rate t corresponds to an emission tax of that rate on emissions e plus a lump sum payment of te0. However, the product-recycling effect is different with respect to the subsidy. Under the subsidy, the revenue-recycling effect has an impact on efficiency, as the government now has to raise taxes on labour to fund the subsidy. Thus, a mitigation subsidy in a second better environment is a disadvantage in terms of efficiency compared to an emissions tax that benefits from the revenue-recycling effect, since the subsidy must be financed by costly distorting taxes49. In his 1937 book A History of Political Theory, George Sabine collected the views of many political theorists on the approval of the governed. He took note of the idea evoked in 1433 by Nicolas de Cusa in De Concordantia Catholica. In 1579, vindiciae contra tyrannos appeared a powerful Huguenot treatise, which describes Sabine: “The people define the conditions that the king must fulfill.
Therefore, they are bound only under certain conditions to obedience, that is, if they enjoy the protection of a just and legitimate government. .